One to serve as a generalizations the second as a particularization, (1) and the third [is required] in respect of things which are not eaten. (2) And according to R. Simeon who maintained that the things which cannot be eaten do not involve liability on account of uncleanness, what does it include? — It includes the inner sin-offerings. You might think that since R. Simeon said, Whatever does not come on the outer altar, like peaceofferings, does not involve liability on account of Piggul then it does not involve liability on account of uncleanness either. Hence [Scripture) informs us [that it is not so]. Said R. Simeon: That which is normally eaten, etc. (3) It was stated, R. Johanan and Resh Lakish, R. Eleazar and R. Jose son of R. Hanina [are the pairs concerned in the following discussion], one of the former pair and one of the latter pair: One maintained: The controversy [in the Mishnah] refers to uncleanness of the flesh; (4) but in the case of personal uncleanness all agree that [the offender] is not flagellated. But the other maintained: As there is a controversy in the one case, so is there in the other. [Raba said, Logic supports the view that as there is a controversy in the one case, so is there in the other.] (5) What is the reason? — Since the text, And the flesh that toucheth any unclean thing (6) is applicable to it, then the text having his uncleanness upon him (7) is applicable to it too. (8) That is how R. Tabyomi recited [this discussion]. R. Kahana recited [the views of] one of the former pair and one of the latter pair as referring to the final clause: (9) One maintained: The controversy refers to personal uncleanness, but in the case of uncleanness of flesh all agree that he is flagellated. While the other maintained: As there is a controversy in the one case, so is there in the other. Raba said, Logic supports the view that as there is a controversy in the one case, so is there in the other. What is the reason? — Since the text, ‘Having his uncleanness upon him’, is not applicable to it, (10) the text, ‘And the flesh that toucheth any unclean thing’ is not applicable to it. But surely a master said: ‘And the flesh’ is to include the wood and the frankincense? (11) — That is a mere disqualification. (12) MISHNAH. THE SACRIFICE IS SLAUGHTERED FOR THE SAKE OF SIX THINGS: FOR THE SAKE OF THE SACRIFICE, FOR THE SAKE OF THE SACRIFICER, FOR THE SAKE OF THE [DIVINE] NAME, FOR THE SAKE OF FIREOFFERINGS, FOR THE SAKE OF A SAVOUR, FOR THE SAKE OF PLEASING, AND A SINOFFERING AND A GUILT-OFFERING FOR THE SAKE OF SIN. R. JOSE SAID: EVEN IF ONE DID NOT HAVE ANY OF THESE PURPOSES IN HIS HEART, IT IS VALID, BECAUSE IT IS A REGULATION OF THE BETH DIN, SINCE THE INTENTION IS DETERMINED ONLY BY THE CELEBRANT. (13) GEMARA. Rab Judah said in Rab's name: [Scripture says, It is a burnt-offering, an offering made by fire, of pleasing savor unto the Lord]. (14) ‘A burnt-offering’ [intimates that it must be slaughtered] for the sake of a burnt-offering, excluding [where it is slaughtered] for the sake of a peace-offering, in which case it does not [acquit the owner of his obligation]. ‘An offering made by fire’ [intimates that] it must be for the sake of an offering made by fire, excluding the charring of the meat, (15) which is not [valid]. ‘Savor’ [intimates that] it must be for the sake of a savor: this excludes the roasting of limbs [elsewhere] and bringing them up [on the altar], which is not [valid]. (16) For Rab Judah said in Rab's name: If one roasted limbs and took them up on to the altar, they do not fulfill the requirements of ‘savor’. ‘Pleasing’ [intimates that] it must be for the sake of pleasing the Lord, for the sake of Him who spoke and called the world into existence. Rab Judah said in Rab's name: If one slaughtered a sin-offering under the designation of a burnt-offering, it is invalid; [if one slaughtered it] under the designation of hullin, it is valid. R. Eleazar (17) said: What is Rab's reason? — And they shall not profane the holy things of the children of Israel: (18) ‘holy things’ profane ‘holy things’, but hullin does not profane holy things. (19) Rabbah raised an objection: R. JOSE SAID: EVEN IF ONE DID NOT HAVE ANY OF THESE PURPOSES IN HIS HEART, IT IS VALID, BECAUSE IT IS A REGULATION OF THE BETH DIN. Thus it is only because he had no [purpose] in his heart at all; hence, if he intended it (20) for the sake of hullin, it is invalid? — Said Abaye to him: Perhaps [this deduction is to be made]: if he had no intention at all, it is valid and propitiates while if he intended it for the sake of hullin it is valid but does not propitiate. (21) R. Eleazar said: If one slaughters a sinoffering for the sake of hullin, (22) it is valid; [if one slaughtered it] as hullin,23 it is invalid. (24) This is as the question which Samuel asked R. Huna:

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(1). ↑ When anything is included in a generalization, and is then made the subject of a particularization, it throws light not only upon itself but upon everything included in the generalization. Now Lev. XXII, (3) (q.v.) is a generalization, including all ‘holy things’ and thus the peace-offering too. The latter is therefore singled out in Lev. VII, (20) to teach that as peaceofferings are of the ‘holy things’ of the altar, so does the ‘holy things’ in XXII, (3) also mean those belonging to the altar, sc. sacrifices.
(2). ↑ E.g., the wood used on the altar and the frankincense. If one nevertheless ate these whilst unclean, he incurs kareth.
(3). ↑ As in the Mishnah, 45b, with slight variation. V. Rashi on the Mishnah.
(4). ↑ Hence of the wood and incense.
(5). ↑ Bracketed passage added by Sh. M.
(6). ↑ Lev. VII, 19.
(7). ↑ Ibid. 20.
(8). ↑ I.e., if the first text applies to wood and frankincense, then the second does too.
(9). ↑ I.e., to R. Simeon's exemption from liability.
(10). ↑ In the Rabbis’ view. — Before he said, ‘is applicable to it’, as he referred to R. Simeon's view.
(11). ↑ Supra 34a.
(12). ↑ The law disqualifying unclean wood and frankincense is only Rabbinical, this Biblical interpretation being a mere support.
(13). ↑ The priest who performs the service, and not the owner of the sacrifice. If the former intended it for a different purpose, it counts as a sacrifice so offered, notwithstanding that the owner intended it for its rightful purpose. — V. supra 2b for notes.
(14). ↑ Lev. I, 13.
(15). ↑ I.e., the intention to make roast pieces of flesh.
(16). ↑ Since the ‘savor’ is then not made on the altar.
(17). ↑ Sh. M.: Elai.
(18). ↑ Lev. XXII, 15.
(19). ↑ Cf. supra 3a, 5a.
(20). ↑ Lit. ‘if he had in his heart.’
(21). ↑ The owner is not acquitted of his obligation; cf. supra 2a.
(22). ↑ I.e., he knew that it was a sin-offering, and yet slaughtered it for the sake of hullin.
(23). ↑ Thinking that it was hullin.
(24). ↑ Since in his mind he was not engaged with sacrifices at all.